Self Referential Strange Loops of Godel's Theorem Violate Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle?

Yakir Aharonov's student, David Albert's (professor at Columbia) new book Quantum Mechanics and Experience (Harvard,1994) is not easy to read but it is very important and profound. Albert writes in a very informal almost rude New York street style that is both a bit shocking and refreshing.

The most important part of the book is the last chapter on self- referential quantum measurements and its remarkable implications for the physics of our private subjective experience.

... so the story we're in the middle of here can just as well be thought of as the story of a measurement ... which h carries out, with the help of the appropriate instruments on herself ... given the linearity of the equations of motion ... p.181 ...
h knows (effectively) the value of the color of the electron, and h also knows (genuinely) the values of [Q], even though [Q] and the color of the electron are quantum mechanically incompatible with one another.
And of course that amounts to a direct violation of the familiar quantum-mechanical uncertainty relations. p. 183
...no observer in the world other than h herself can ever be in a position (no matter what the quantum state of the world is) to simultaneously know (either genuinely or effectively) the values of the color of the electron and of the [Q]. pp185-6

Here Albert says it flat out! Owing I'm much disposed I fear to my terrible taste, for Frank Tipler, this highly respectable quantum engineer, is out of one of his minds, it is now quite clear, but which of the two, that is not quite clear (a take off on Glibert and Sullivan's Gondoliers to be sung by me in multimedia version :-)) Seriously, folks compare Albert's astoundingly heretical juicy remark to Feynman's, i.e.,

The complete theory of quantum mechanics which we now use to describe atoms and, in fact, all matter, depends on the correctness of the uncertainty principle. Since quantum mechanics is such a successful theory, our belief in the uncertainty principle is reinforced. But if a way to "beat" the uncertainty principle were ever discovered, quantum mechanics would give inconsistent results and would have to be discarded as a valid theory of nature."

1-6 Vol III, Feynman Lectures on Physics On the privacy of our qualia, Albert continues:

Suppose ... h consents to allow some future act of hers to be determined (in accordance with some fixed decision table) by the results of some upcoming measurements of the [Q] and the color of the electron. On Bohm's theory, there is, right now (that is, before those upcoming measurements get carried out) an objective physical matter of fact about what the future act of h's is going to be, and (moreover) no other observer in the world (no matter how adept they may be at measuring or calculating) can possibly know (right now) what that act is going to be.
And so h, under these sorts of circumstances (even though the complete physical theory of the world her is a deterministic one), has what you might call an inviolably private will." p.188
And so the mental lives of quantum-mechanical observers who could arrange to carry out these sorts of measurements on their own brains would perhaps be unimaginably (for us) rich." p.189

Albert is not using a nonlinear nonunitary theory like the one proposed by Henry Stapp in Physical Review A, July, 1994 (pp18-24). He claims to use the linear orthodox theory. But the strange loop of self-measurement is the wild card. This book deserves careful study.